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Abstract
Maudlin has claimed that no local theory can reproduce the predictions of standard quantum me-
chanics that violate Bell’s inequality for Bohm’s version (two spin-half particles in a singlet state) of the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem. It is argued that, on the contrary, standard quantum mechanics itself
is a counterexample to Maudlin’s claim, because it is local in the appropriate sense (measurements at
one place do not influence what occurs elsewhere there) when formulated using consistent principles in
place of the inconsistent appeals to “measurement” found in current textbooks. This argument sheds
light on the claim of Blaylock that counterfactual definiteness is an essential ingredient in derivations of
Bell’s inequality.
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I Introduction
Blaylock has argued that derivations of Bell’s inequality involve an implicit assumption of counterfactual
definiteness as well as locality, and consequently the fact that quantum theory violates Bell’s inequality is
consistent with the quantum world being local (as well as realistic and deterministic).1 In response Maudlin2
asserted that Bell’s result does not require counterfactual definiteness, and the fact that quantum theory
violates it means that the quantum world is nonlocal: no local theory can reproduce The Predictions of
quantum mechanics for the results of experiments done very far apart.
In this article we shall show that this last assertion is mistaken, by exhibiting a local theory for the
situation of interest: measurements of various components of spin angular momentum on two spin-half
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particles prepared in a singlet state. (Blaylock considers polarization measurements on two photons, but
these measurements amount to the same situation for the issues under discussion.) Because Maudlin’s
argument is clearly written and relatively short, it is possible to make a useful comparison between it
and the sort of reasoning needed to yield consistent results in the quantum domain. The connection with
counterfactual definiteness will also be discussed.
The reader is probably aware that Bell’s inequality — see Ref. 1 for extensive references — puts constraints
on certain correlation functions relating properties of separated systems, or measurements of these properties.
Quantum mechanics predicts violations of these constraints, and measurements confirm the predictions
of quantum theory. Consequently, any derivation of Bell’s inequality must violate one or more of the
fundamental principles of quantum mechanics; or to put it another way, when viewed from a quantum
perspective such a derivation contains one or more mistakes. On this point Blaylock, Maudlin, and the
present author are in full agreement. The issue is: where and what are the mistakes? Finding mistakes
is sometimes difficult. Many of us have experienced the frustration of dealing with a student asking us to
find the error in a lengthy argument which he thinks is valid, but which leads to a result that we know is
wrong. Various derivations of Bell’s inequality are complicated and involve probabilistic reasoning that is not
straightforward. And sometimes additional assumptions, such as the existence of agents with free choice,3, 4
move the discussion out of the realm of simple physics. Understanding these arguments, much less finding
mistakes in them, can be an arduous task. We are fortunate that the argument for nonlocality in Ref. 2 is
clear, compact, well written, and free choice plays no essential role.
The present paper is not intended to discuss all the assumptions that underlie various derivations of Bell’s
inequality, or their possible validity in domains unrelated to quantum theory. Instead, the primary issue
addressed is: at what point do Bell’s arguments, in particular as presented in Ref. 2, conflict with quantum
theory?
Maudlin is not alone in maintaining that violations of Bell’s inequality imply that quantum mechanics
is nonlocal. For an extended, though by no means complete, list of publications that have maintained this
position, together with a significant number that have expressed disagreement, see the bibliography in Ref. 5,
which contains a more detailed analysis of the Bell inequality from the perspective summarized in the present
paper, along with a proof of an appropriate form of Einstein locality.
Issues of the sort under discussion cannot be resolved within the framework of standard quantum mechan-
ics, when that is understood to be what is found in contemporary textbooks. Although textbooks provide
students with many effective and efficient techniques for doing calculations, they do not contain an adequate
presentation of the fundamental principles of the theory needed to understand why these techniques lead to
reasonable answers, and what are their limits of applicability. Students become skilled at calculating the
right answer, but are left confused or uncertain as to why, or whether, the answer really is right. Inquiries
from the perplexed are met with Mermin’s6 well-known dictum: Shut up and calculate! In particular, at-
tempts to make measurements part of the foundation of quantum mechanics are unsatisfactory because of
the infamous measurement problem: the inability of such an approach to incorporate a physical measuring
apparatus in fully quantum mechanical terms. The difficulties were pointed out by Wigner,7 and remain
unsolved.8, 9
Thus in order to address the question of whether quantum theory is local, a consistent formulation of the
principles that lie behind, and can be used to justify, the textbook calculations is needed; a formulation that,
as Bell emphasized,10 is not based upon measurements, but instead allows us to understand, in quantum-
mechanical terms, what goes on in real measuring processes. Such a formulation, in which probabilities
(but not measurements) are fundamental, exists, and deserves to be better known. We shall refer to it as
the histories approach; alternative names are consistent histories11 and decoherent histories.12 For further
references and details see Ref. 13; for short introductions see Refs. 14 and 15. It yields what Maudlin calls
“The Predictions” for Bohm’s version16 of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) problem.17 It is explicitly
local, as discussed below, and was applied by the author to the EPR problem in Ref. 18.
Because many readers will not be familiar with the histories approach (it is not mentioned in Refs. 1
and 2), some of its fundamental features are presented in a compact form in Sec. II, which deals with
quantum statics, and in Sec. III, devoted to quantum dynamics. The histories approach is not based upon
the concept of measurement, and readers who try to understand it in terms of measurements are likely to
become confused. It is better to start with a mental picture of a classical system inside a closed box in
which the dynamics is intrinsically random or stochastic. Things actually happen inside the box, but what
happens in the future (or in the past) cannot be inferred with certainty from the state of affairs at a given
point in time. As with any classical picture of the world, this one can only be a first step on the way to
a fully consistent quantum description, but it is less likely to mislead than trying to think about things in
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terms of measurements associated with mysterious wave function collapses, as in current textbooks.
Section IV discusses how genuine measurements, understood as real physical processes that go on in the
real (quantum) world, can be understood from the perspective of fundamental quantum theory. The tools
will then be in hand for a consistent analysis in Sec. V of the Bohm version of the EPR situation using two
spin-half particles in a singlet state, both with and without measurements, demonstrating the locality of
quantum theory.
Maudlin’s argument for nonlocality2 is examined in Sec. VI A in order to locate how and where it diverges
from the analysis in Sec. V. Counterfactuals in the quantum domain are discussed in Sec. VI B, with the
conclusion that their misuse can plausibly be part of one route leading to Bell’s inequality, as Blaylock
indicates in Ref. 1, though perhaps it is not the only route. The paper ends with a brief summary and some
comments in Sec. VII.
II Quantum statics
The most fundamental difference between classical and quantum mechanics is that the former makes
use of a phase space whose individual points represent possible states of a physical system, with subsets of
points representing physical properties. Whereas, as explained by von Neumann,19 quantum mechanics uses
a complex Hilbert space, and physical properties correspond to subspaces, with a one-dimensional subspace
(ray) the quantum analog of a single point in phase space. A finite-dimensional Hilbert space is adequate
for purposes of the following discussion. In classical mechanics the logical negation of the property P that
corresponds to a set of points P in the phase space, which is to say the property “not P”, is represented by
the set-theoretic complement Pc of the set P . In the quantum case negation19 corresponds to the orthogonal
complement P⊥ of the subspace P : the collection of all vectors in the Hilbert space that are orthogonal to
every vector in the subspace. Equivalently, if P is the projector onto P , its negation is represented by the
projector I − P , where I is the identity operator on the Hilbert space.
|1〉
|2〉
P
P⊥
Q
|z+〉
|z−〉
|x+〉
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of a two-dimensional Hilbert space using the real plane, with a basis consisting
of the orthogonal kets |1〉 and |2〉, and various rays (one-dimensional subspaces) as discussed in the text.
This leads to a profound difference between classical and quantum properties, which is best illustrated by
considering a two-dimensional Hilbert space representing possible properties of a spin-half particle, shown
schematically in Fig. 1. (The figure shows a real, rather than a complex Hilbert space, but it is adequate
for present purposes.) The line P through the origin represents the physical property Sz = +1/2 in units of
h¯. The line P⊥ perpendicular to this line is its orthogonal complement and represents the physical property
Sz = −1/2. The key point is that there are many other lines through the origin, such as Q corresponding
(schematically) to the property Sx = 1/2, which are neither the same as the property Sz = +1/2 or its
negation, Sz = −1/2. This is fundamentally different from classical phase space where for a given property
P , any point in the phase space is either inside the set P , which means the system this property P , or
in its complement Pc, which means the system does not have property P . In quantum mechanics we say
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that two properties P and Q, such as Sz = +1/2 and Sx = 1/2, are incompatible when the projectors onto
the corresponding subspaces do not commute, PQ 6= QP . Whenever noncommuting operators appear in
quantum mechanics we have a situation that lacks a precise analog in classical physics.
A consequence of adopting the von Neumann approach to quantum properties, which underlies the
presentations in all contemporary textbooks, is that quantum reasoning must follow different rules from
classical reasoning. For a classical phase space the conjunction of two properties P and Q, P ∧Q or “P AND
Q,” is always defined: it is the property corresponding to the intersection P ∩ Q of the corresponding sets
of points. But in the quantum case let P be the property Sz = +1/2 and Q be the incompatible property
Sx = −1/2. Can we make any sense of the conjunction “P AND Q”? Does it correspond to any ray in
the Hilbert space? The answer is that it does not, or at least there is no plausible way to make such an
association. Every ray in Hilbert space can be interpreted as the property that Sw = +1/2 for some direction
in space w, so there is nothing left over to represent a conjunction of the sort in which we are interested.
There is no room for it in Hilbert space. What shall we do?
Von Neumann was not unaware of this problem, and he and Birkhoff made a proposal20 that if P and Q
refer to incompatible properties, “P AND Q” should be the property corresponding to the intersection P∩Q
of the corresponding subspaces of Hilbert space. As applied to the situation at hand, the intersection of the
Sz = +1/2 and Sx = −1/2 rays is the subspace consisting of nothing but the zero vector, the origin in Fig. 1.
The orthogonal complement of the zero vector is the entire Hilbert space, so the zero vector represents a
proposition which is always false; it is the counterpart of the empty set for a classical phase space. This is
an interesting proposal; let us pursue it for a bit and see where it leads, using a notation in which single
letters
z+ = |z+〉〈z+|, x− = |x−〉〈x−|, (1)
and so forth correspond to projectors onto the rays Sz = +1/2, Sx = −1/2, and so forth. Then the usual
logical rules, with ∧ and ∨ meaning AND and OR, lead to the expression
(
z+ ∧ x−
)
∨
(
z+ ∧ x+
)
= z+ ∧
(
x− ∨ x+
)
= z+, (2)
where we have used the fact that x− ∨ x+ is always true, because it is the negation of the always false
property x+ ∧ x−.
But there is a serious problem with Eq. (2). The proposition or property on the left side is always false,
as it is the disjunction of two always-false properties. So if we believe the equation, the property z+, the
final term on the right, is always false. We could just as well have used z− in place of z+, and drawn the
conclusion that z− is always false. Hence z+∨ z− is always false. But this contradicts the fact—see previous
paragraph—that z+ ∨ z− is always true! We have arrived at a logical contradiction. How could two of the
great mathematicians of the 20th century have made such a blunder? The answer is that they did not.
They were quite aware that this problem was going to arise, and that the ordinary rules of propositional
logic would have to be modified. So they proposed discarding the distributive rule, which justifies the first
equality in Eq. (2), to produce what has come to be known as quantum logic.
Does quantum logic provide a consistent underpinning of the calculational techniques found in quantum
textbooks? Not likely. Although quantum logic has been extensively studied as a subdiscipline of quantum
foundations, so far as I am aware it has made no contribution to resolving the conceptual difficulties besetting
quantum theory. It seems not to be used in quantum information theory, which is currently the “cutting
edge” of developments in quantum theory, that is, in extending its concepts. This situation may simply
reflect the fact that professional physicists are not smart enough to really understand quantum mechanics,
and the problems of quantum foundations will have to remain unresolved until robots surpass our intelligence
and can learn to think using the new rules. (But if they do come to understand quantum mechanics, will
they be smart enough, or even sufficiently motivated, to explain it to us?)
But surely the textbooks must do something with incompatible properties, and if Birkhoff’s and von
Neumann’s reasoning has not been adopted, what takes its place? One can discern two strategies. The first
is based on measurements. There is no way to simultaneously measure Sz and Sx for a spin-half particle.
On this everyone agrees, but we are back to the unsolved measurement problem. The second is to invoke
the uncertainty principle. There are elegant mathematical formulations of various uncertainty principles to
be found inside and outside textbooks. But what do they mean? What it means in practice for the student
learning the subject is that certain things are best not discussed, or if they are, the discussion should be
accompanied by an appropriate amount of vagueness and arm waving. If one is discussing Sz, then it is
probably best to leave Sx out of the discussion, though one is somewhat uncertain as to why certain things
are uncertain.
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The histories approach uses a precise principle in place of arm waving. Incompatible properties cannot be
combined in a meaningful quantum description of the world, even if the individual properties by themselves
make perfectly good sense. The statement “Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = −1/2” makes no sense. It is very
important to keep in mind the distinction between “makes no sense” or “meaningless,” and “always false.”
A statement that is meaningful and false — see our discussion of the Birkhoff and von Neumann approach
— is one whose negation is meaningful and true. By contrast, the negation of a meaningless statement is
equally meaningless. In ordinary logic the statement P ∧∨Q, which is to say “P AND OR Q,” is meaningless,
because it has not been formed according to the syntactical rules appropriate to the language. One should
think of “Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = −1/2” as similar – it is meaningless in the sense that quantum mechanics
cannot assign it a meaning.
Similarly, “Sz = +1/2 OR Sx = −1/2” is not a meaningful statement about quantum properties, so it
makes no sense to ask, “Is the spin-half particle in the state Sx = 1/2 or the state Sz = 1/2 or possibly
both?” Students are taught that there is no way of measuring both Sx and Sz simultaneously, and this
statement is correct. Unfortunately, they are not taught that the reason such measurements are impossible
is that there is nothing there to be measured: there is no physical property in the quantum world that such
a measurement might reveal. It is not the limited ability of experimental physicists that is at issue; in fact,
one sign of a good experimental physicist is his inability to measure what is not there.
In the histories approach the rule for not combining incompatible properties is part of a more general
single framework rule. A framework is a projective decomposition of the identity: a collection of projectors
{Pµ}, where µ is a label not an exponent, which sum to the identity operator:
I =
∑
µ
Pµ, Pµ = (Pµ)† = (Pµ)2, PµP ν = δµνP
µ. (3)
Each projector corresponds to a physical property. The significance of PµP ν = 0 when µ 6= ν is that
these properties are mutually exclusive: if one is true the other is necessarily false. The collection of such
properties form a quantum sample space: not only are they mutually exclusive, but together they exhaust
all possibilities — that is the significance of
∑
µ P
µ = I. The events, using the terminology of probability
theory, associated with this sample space are projectors formed by taking sums of elements in the collection
{Pµ}, including I and the 0 projector; together they comprise a Boolean algebra under (operator) products
and taking the complement I − P of P .
Two such frameworks are compatible if the projectors in the first commute with all the projectors in
the second; otherwise they are incompatible. Two compatible frameworks have a common refinement : a
single framework whose Boolean algebra includes all the projectors of both of the original frameworks.
Two incompatible frameworks have no common refinement. The single framework rule asserts that all
reasoning about a quantum system must be carried out in a single framework in the sense that results from
two frameworks cannot be combined. Given two compatible frameworks the single framework rule is easily
satisfied: carry out the reasoning using a common refinement. Consequently, what the single framework rule
prohibits is combining, or attempting to combine, results from incompatible frameworks.
It is important to understand just what the single framework rule allows and what it prohibits. Physicists
are free to employ whatever framework they wish when describing a quantum system: formulas can be written
down and probabilities calculated using the Sx or {x+, x−}, or the Sz framework for a spin-half particle.
Call this freedom the principle of Liberty. There is no law of nature, or of quantum theory, that says that
one of these is the “right” framework; from the perspective of fundamental quantum theory they are equally
correct. Call this the principle of Equality. But Liberty and Equality are accompanied by a third principle:
Incompatibility. Results in two incompatible frameworks cannot be combined in a meaningful way. What
these principles amount to in practice will become apparent when we consider various examples.
Note that when a physicist chooses to use a particular framework rather than some other to describe
a quantum system, this is not at all a matter of somehow “influencing” the system in question. Instead,
such choices are somewhat like the choices a photographer makes in photographing Mount Rainier from, say,
the north rather than from the south. Such a choice determines what kind of information is present, and
consequently the utility or the use which can be made of the resulting photograph. But it has no influence
on the mountain itself. Choosing a framework is thus very different from carrying out a measurement on a
system, because a measurement can have a rather drastic effect upon a microscopic quantum system.
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III Quantum dynamics
Von Neumann19 taught us that quantum dynamics involves two distinct processes: a unitary or deter-
ministic time evolution, and then a separate stochastic or probabilistic time evolution associated in some way
with measurements. Although this is what students learn in textbooks, both students and teachers (and, one
suspects, textbook writers — see Ref. 21) find it unaesthetic. One can sympathize with the efforts of Everett
and his successors22, 23 to reduce all of quantum dynamics to a unitary form (for a closed system), even
though the “many worlds” (or “many minds”) approach has its own share of obscurities and difficulties.24–26
Blaylock1 is in favor of the many-worlds interpretation, and Maudlin2 is not.
The histories approach used in this paper is the exact opposite of Everett’s in the sense that quantum
time evolution is always stochastic, or more precisely, should always be put in a stochastic or probabilistic
framework. Classical (Hamiltonian) dynamics is deterministic: there is a unique map carrying each point in
the phase space at a give time to another specific point at any particular later (or earlier) time. But there is
no reason why the quantum world should necessarily possess the same sort of deterministic time development.
And there is good experimental support, as in the random time of decay of unstable particles, for the idea
that quantum dynamics has an intrinsically probabilistic character. But what about the wave function that
satisfies the Schro¨dinger’s (time-dependent and deterministic) equation? Solutions to Schro¨dinger’s equation
are to be used for calculating probabilities. This is what Born27 taught us and what is done in textbooks.
Formulating probabilistic ideas using histories, as in Ref. 13, Chap. 8, results in a consistent approach that
removes (or at least “tames”) quantum paradoxes.
A consistent discussion of a stochastic process, whether classical or quantum, begins by introducing a
sample space of mutually exclusive possibilities, which we shall refer to as histories. These can be represented,
just as quantum properties at a single time, by subspaces on a history Hilbert space consisting of a tensor
product of copies of the Hilbert space describing a quantum system at a single time, and with the projectors
on the history space playing a role analogous to those corresponding to properties at a single time. (For
details, see Ref. 13, Chap. 8.) Once again, there are many possibilities for such sample spaces, and the single
framework rule says that the physicist is welcome to use any one he pleases (Liberty and Equality), as long
as he does not put together meaningless combinations of incompatible sample spaces (Incompatibility). The
simplest sorts of histories consist of just a sequence of quantum properties at a succession of different times,
and the set of properties considered at one time may be incompatible with the set considered at a different
time. Thus there is nothing inherently wrong with saying that at successive times t1 < t2 < t3 a spin-half
particle has Sz = +1/2 and then Sx = −1/2, and then Sz = −1/2, or perhaps Sy = −1/2 at the third time.
These properties need not, and generally do not, map into one another under the unitary time evolution of
a closed system generated by Schro¨dinger’s equation.
For this paper it will suffice to consider histories for a sequence of times t0 < t1 < t2 < · · · tf which can
be represented in the form
Y α = Ψ0 ⊙ Pα11 ⊙ Pα22 ⊙ · · ·Pαff , (4)
where Ψ0 = |Ψ0〉〈Ψ0| projects onto the initial state |Ψ0〉 at t0, so all histories begin with this initial state, and
{Pαjj } denotes a (projective) decomposition of the identity I at time tj , see Eq. (3). The time is labeled by
a subscript, and decompositions at different times need have no relation with one another. The superscript
on the history Y α denotes a string of labels:
α = (α1, α2, . . . αf ). (5)
The ⊙ symbols in Eq. (4) can be interpreted as variants of the usual ⊗ symbol denoting a tensor product,
but for present purposes we can think of them as simply separating possible events at one time from events
at the next time.
Probabilities can be assigned to histories if such a family represents events in a closed quantum system, in
the following way. Let T (t′, t) be the unitary time development operator; for example, if the system Hamil-
tonian H is independent of time, then T (t′, t) = exp[−i(t′ − t)H/h¯]. For history α define the corresponding
chain ket :
|α〉 = Pαff T (tf , tf−1) · · ·Pα11 T (t1, t0)|Ψ0〉. (6)
Then provided the consistency condition
〈α|β〉 = 0 wheneverα 6= β (7)
is satisfied, the probability of history α is given by
Pr(α) = 〈α|α〉, (8)
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assuming that |Ψ0〉 in Eq. (6) is a normalized state. Here α 6= β means that for at least one j it is the case
that αj 6= βj .
For a history family involving a large number of times Eq. (7) is a fairly stringent constraint. However,
for families that involve only two times, thus one time t1 following the initial time t0, it is always satisfied
because of the assumed orthogonality of the projectors at time t1. In this case
Pr(α1) = 〈Ψ0|T (t0, t1)Pα11 T (t1, t0)|Ψ0〉 (9)
is simply the usual Born rule, so Eq. (8) represents a generalization of the Born rule to histories involving
three or more times, for which one has to pay attention to Eq. (7). Note that the probability assignment in
Eq. (8), of which Eq. (9) is a special case, makes no reference to measurements, and in this sense is distinct
from what is found in textbooks. However, by using it as a fundamental axiom one can, as for example in
Sec. IV, justify all the usual textbook calculations.
What is usually found in textbooks is not Eq. (9) but the equivalent expression
Pr(α1) = 〈Ψ(t1)|Pα11 |Ψ(t1)〉 = |〈Φα11 |Ψ(t1)〉|2, (10)
where the second equality applies when Pα11 is a rank one projector onto the pure state |Φα11 〉. Here
|Ψ(t)〉 := T (t, t0)|Ψ0〉 (11)
is obtained by integrating Schro¨dinger’s equation starting with |Ψ0〉, and is often referred to as the wave
function. However, this |Ψ(t)〉 is best viewed as a calculational tool, rather than, as in Everett’s interpre-
tation, the actual state of the universe, or that part of the universe that constitutes the closed quantum
system under discussion. There are two ways to see this. One is that in general the corresponding projector
Ψ(t) = |Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)| does not commute with the projector Pα11 , which in the family of histories Eq. (4)
represents a particular physical property at time t1. As one cannot in the histories approach ascribe two
incompatible properties to a single quantum system at the same instant of time, |Ψ(t)〉 cannot represent a
physical property when we use the family Eq. (4).
The second way to see that |Ψ(t1)〉 in Eq. (10) is nothing but a calculational tool is to calculate the same
probability by another method which makes no mention of it:
Pr(α1) = |〈Φα1(t0)|Ψ0〉|2, (12)
where
|Φα1(t)〉 = T (t, t1)|Φα11 〉 (13)
is again obtained by integrating Schro¨dinger’s equation (in the opposite time direction) to obtain the |Φα1(t0)〉
used in Eq. (12). Because the same probability can be obtained using either |Ψ(t1)〉 or |Φα1(t0)〉, they can
be regarded as alternative calculational tools, or pre-probabilities in the notation of Ref. 13, Sec. 9.4. A
pre-probability is used to calculate probabilities of physical properties, and is thus if anything less real than
the probabilities assigned to real properties. Hence “the” wave function plays a very secondary role in the
histories approach, quite different from Everett or many worlds.
To be sure, there are special unitary families of histories in which “the” wave function is closely associated
with physical properties; an example is given below. Before discussing it, let us note that just as there are
incompatible quantum properties, there are also incompatible histories, and the latter must be treated
in much the same way as the former. A collection of histories associated with a suitable sample space, for
example, the {Y α} defined in Eq. (4), is referred to as a framework or consistent family1 of histories provided
the consistency conditions, Eq. (7), for the family under consideration, are satisfied. Two such families may
be either compatible or incompatible. They are compatible if there is a common refinement, a family of more
detailed histories which includes both families we started with, and also satisfies the consistency conditions.
Otherwise they are incompatible, and the single framework rule says they are not to be combined, or the
combination is meaningless (quantum theory can assign it no meaning). Once again, the pillars of good
quantum reasoning are Liberty, Equality, and Incompatibility; see the discussion at the end of Sec. II. In
particular, Equality means that from the point of view of fundamental quantum mechanics there is no reason
to prefer one consistent family to another, there is no law of nature that singles out “the right family.”
1The terms “framework” and “consistent family” are used both for the sample space and the corresponding event algebra it
generates. If the distinction is important, we can refer to a “consistent sample space of histories.”
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How this works can be illustrated by the case of Schro¨dinger’s poor cat whose sorry history is no doubt
familiar to the reader. Under unitary time evolution the cat ends up in a state which can be described
as a superposition of dead and alive, which Schro¨dinger and his successors found perplexing. So how does
the histories approach deal with it? First, there must be a choice of a framework, which is to say a series
of possibilities at the different times of interest. Let the initial state |Ψ0〉 include the cat, the apparatus,
and whatever else is needed to treat this as a closed quantum system. One possible family of histories is
that in which at each time tj , P
0
J = |Ψ(tj)〉〈Ψ(tj)| is a projector onto the subspace containing “the” wave
function as defined by Eq. (11); P 1j = I − P 0j is its negation. This family is unitary in the notation in
Ref. 13, Sec. 8.7; it is consistent, and the physicist who wants to use it is at Liberty to do so. But the
historian will remind him that referring to “Schro¨dinger cat” states at later times constitutes something of
a misnomer because the corresponding projector P 0j will (at least in general) not commute with projectors
for physical properties of anything one would want to call a cat. If the physicist — says the historian —
wants to discuss what is happening to something that can properly be called a cat, then it is necessary to
adopt a different framework, one containing projectors referring to states in which the cat is dead or alive
as mutually exclusive possibilities. Such frameworks exist, are just as fundamental (Equality) as the unitary
framework, and of much greater utility to the physicist interested in biology or some other aspect of the
ordinary macroscopic world.
IV Measurements
One of the unfortunate features of contemporary quantum mechanics textbooks is their inability to make
much sense of experiments of the sort that are done all the time in the laboratory by competent experimental
physicists. Such measurements are typically designed to reveal properties possessed by systems before the
measurement takes place. What does this electrical pulse mean? It means that the proton knocked out
of the target by the high energy electron has ionized the gas near a pair of wires in the detector. . . . By
the time they give talks reporting their results experimental physicists seem to have forgotten (fortunately)
what they learned from textbooks about measurements magically producing reality out of nothing. When
the quantum analysis is done properly using histories, one finds that the experimentalists are correct. Once
one allows them Liberty their discussions make perfectly good sense.
A simple schematic example of an idealized measuring process can be used to illustrate the essential
points. We assume the Hilbert spaces of the system to be measured and the measuring apparatus are Hs
and HM , and that at the earliest time, t0, the two are in a product state |s〉 ⊗ |M0〉. The unitary time
development operator T (t′, t) is the identity between t0 and t1, but in the interval from t1 to t2 the system
interacts with the apparatus as indicated here, with time steps in the order t0 → t1 → t2:
|Ψj〉 = |sj〉 ⊗ |M0〉 → |sj〉 ⊗ |M0〉 → |s¯j〉 ⊗ |M j〉. (14)
The {|sj〉} form an orthonormal basis of Hs, assumed to be a Hilbert space of finite dimension,2 the {|M j〉}
are orthogonal to each other, and the {|s¯j〉} are normalized states in Hs, but not necessarily orthogonal. We
do not have to assume that |s¯j〉 = |sj〉.
Assume an initial state
|Ψ0〉 = |s〉 ⊗ |M0〉 =
(∑
j
cj |sj〉
)
⊗ |M0〉 (15)
at t0, and a family of histories [see Eq. (4)],
Ψ0 ⊙ {sj} ⊙ {Mk}. (16)
As in Eq. (1) the letters denote projectors: sj = |sj〉〈sj |, etc. Each history begins with the initial state |Ψ0〉
at t0. At time t1 the particle is in one of the states |sj〉, and at t2 the apparatus pointer is in the position
indicated by the projector Mk. Notice that these histories contain no reference to the measuring apparatus
at time t1; think of s
j as the same as sj ⊗ IM . Nor is there any reference to the state of the particle at time
t2. Given the dynamics in Eq. (14) it is straightforward to show that the consistency conditions, Eq. (7),
are satisfied and the probabilities are, in an obvious notation where subscripts denote the time,
Pr(sj1,M
k
2 ) = |cj |2δjk. (17)
2We think of Hs as corresponding to internal states, say spin states, of a particle, and that its center of mass motion toward
a detector is taken care of by using a unitary time development operator T (t′, t) with two arguments, rather than supposing it
depends only on the time difference t′ − t.
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From these one can conclude by summing over j that the probability that the pointer is in state Mk at t2 is
equal to |ck|2, the same result as obtained by the usual textbook rules. But Eq. (17) also yields a conditional
probability:
Pr(sj1 |Mk2 ) = δjk. (18)
That is, if the pointer is in position Mk at time t2, we can be sure that the system was in the state s
k at
the earlier time t1. The apparatus was doing what it was designed to do.
Notice that this analysis makes no assumption about the nature of the |s¯j〉 states that appear at time t2
in the dynamics given in Eq. (14). They are irrelevant if one regards, as is typically the case, the purpose of
the measurement to be that of determining some property of the measured system before interaction with
the apparatus, which may well have altered the property in question, or even destroyed the system (as, for
example, when a photon is absorbed). However, we can also consider the special case of a nondestructive
measurement for which |s¯j〉 = |sj〉 for every j. In this case we may replace the projectors at the final time
t2 in Eq. (16) with {sl ⊗Mk}, and after a short calculation derive the result
Pr(sj1,M
k
2 , s
l
2) = |cj |2δjkδkl. (19)
Thus given that the pointer is in the state Mk at t2 we can deduce the state of the system s both before
and after the measurement.
It is important to observe that the results given here, which agree with the results of textbook calculations
and the belief of experimentalists that they can design good measurements, are not based on a “measurement
postulate” of the sort made by von Neumann and later textbook writers. They are a consequence of Eq. (8)
in a situation in which the consistency conditions, Eq. (7), apply. These are fundamental postulates that
apply to any closed quantum system, which is to say to any situation in which the dynamics is determined
by solving Schro¨dinger’s equation, not just cases in which a measurement is taking place.
But it is also worth noting the sense in which both von Neumann and the textbooks are to some degree
correct. From the histories perspective they can be understood as using a family of histories of the form,
focusing for simplicity on the nondestructive case,
Ψ0 ⊙ {Ψ1, I −Ψ1} ⊙ {sl ⊗Mk}, (20)
where Ψ1 is the projector onto the unitarily-evolved state |Ψ1〉 = T (t1, t0)|Ψ0〉. It is easily checked that
this family is consistent, and physicists are at Liberty to employ it. It provides just as good a description
of nature as Eq. (16). However, the two families are incompatible if at least two of the cj in Eq. (15)
are nonzero; in particular Ψ1 will (in general) not commute with s
j . This fact means that using the family
Eq. (20) precludes saying anything meaningful about the properties of s before the measurement takes place.
So the reticence of textbook authors has some justification: their approach is unable to connect measurement
outcomes with earlier properties, because to do so a framework is needed in which the relevant properties
make sense. The problem is that the very possibility of alternative descriptions, the principles of Liberty
and Equality, are absent from textbook treatments.
To summarize, in order to discuss measurements as measurements in the typical sense in which ex-
perimental physicists think of them, it is necessary to introduce frameworks or families in which both the
measurement outcome and the relevant properties of the system before the measurement takes place are
made part of a consistent family. Textbooks in effect adopt a framework in which outcomes make sense,
because otherwise their discussions would never get off the ground: simple use of unitary time development
leads to macroscopic quantum superpositions and the measurement problem. But then there is no good
reason why, having taken one Liberty, a second, namely frameworks in which properties make sense before
the measurement interaction, should be denied. And this second Liberty is used all the time by the experi-
mentalists; it is past time for theoreticians and textbook writers to catch up. There is more to be said about
wave function collapse, but we defer this to an appropriate point in the following discussion.
V EPR Correlations
V A Entangled states
Let us now turn to the EPR problem17 and its connection with locality, focusing on the standard example
due to Bohm16 of two spin-half particles a and b in the state described by the singlet wave function
|ψ0〉 =
(
|z+a z−b 〉 − |z−a z+b 〉
)
/
√
2, (21)
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where |z+a z−b 〉 = |z+〉a⊗ |z−〉b is an eigenstate of both Saz for the a particle, eigenvalue +1/2, and of Sbz for
the b particle, eigenvalue −1/2; the state |z−a z+b 〉 has a similar interpretation with eigenvalues of the opposite
sign. By contrast, the superposition represented by |ψ0〉 is not an eigenstate of either Saz or Sbz . Indeed, the
corresponding projector ψ0 = |ψ0〉〈ψ0| is incompatible with the property Saw = +1/2 of particle a, where
w is any direction in space, and likewise with Sbw = +1/2. Thus it makes no sense to say that a quantum
system which possesses the property ψ0 has any nontrivial property corresponding to particle a or particle
b, that is, to some subspace of the corresponding Hilbert space. (The trivial properties are the identity and
zero projectors, which are, respectively, always true and always false.)
Before going further it is worth remarking that there is no notion of nonlocality intrinsic to the singlet
state |ψ0〉 as such. After all, it is the spin state of a hydrogen atom or of positronium in its ground state,
where one does not usually think of the particles as in distinct locations. Entanglement as such is a quantum
concept distinct from any notion of nonlocality. To tie |ψ0〉 to nonlocality, one has to to suppose that the two
particles are in different locations. Of course, just this sort of thing is frequently achieved in the laboratory
nowadays, and, when it is, such states can with some justification be called nonlocal.
Nonlocality of this sort is, however, not what Bell and his successors have had in mind when speaking of
nonlocality in quantum mechanics, for one does not need carefully constructed inequalities to demonstrate
that entangled states are present in the quantum Hilbert space. The issue is not one of static nonlocality,
but instead whether quantum theory allows or demands certain nonlocal dynamical effects. As Maudlin
puts it, p. 123 of Ref. 2, the locality assumption which he thinks quantum mechanics violates is that “the
measurement on one particle does not change the state of the other [particle].”
V B Dynamics
We begin our study by considering the dynamics of the spin degrees of freedom of particles a and b,
making the usual assumption that the particles are not interacting with each other and no magnetic fields
are present, and hence the time development operator
T (t′, t) = Ta(t
′, t)⊗ Tb(t′, t) = Ia ⊗ Ib (22)
is trivial. Later we will explore the effects of measurements, but first let us examine what happens in their
absence.
Consider the family of histories based on three times t0 < t1 < t2,
ψ0 ⊙ {z+a , z−a } ⊗ {z+b , z−b } ⊙ {z+a , z−a } ⊗ {z+b , z−b }, (23)
which is to be interpreted as follows. All the histories begin at time t0 with the initial state ψ0 = |ψ0〉〈ψ0|.
At time t1 there are four possible properties or “events”: z
+
a z
+
b = z
+
a ⊗ z+b , which means Saz = +1/2,
Sbz = +1/2, z
+
a z
−
b , z
−
a z
+
b , and z
−
a z
−
b . The same four possibilities occur at the later time t2. Consistency can
be checked and probabilities assigned to the 4× 4 = 16 histories as explained in Sec. III. Only two histories
have nonzero probabilities:
Pr(z+a1, z
−
b1; z
+
a2, z
−
b2) = Pr(z
−
a1, z
+
b1; z
−
a2, z
+
b2) = 1/2. (24)
Here semicolons rather than commas are used to separate events at different times, indicated by subscripts,
to improve legibility. Both semicolons and commas should be read as “AND.”
Summing over the values at t1 yields the marginal probabilities
Pr(z+a2, z
−
b2) = Pr(z
−
a2, z
+
b2) = 1/2 (25)
at time t2. These can be obtained from |ψ0〉 by use of the Born rule (see Sec. III). There is no need to refer
to measurements. Properly built apparatus, as discussed in Sec. V C below, reveals what is there before the
measurement takes place. But Eq. (24) tells us more than Eq. (25). For example, it implies that the values
of Saz are identical at times t1 and t2, a result that is physically reasonable but not implied by the Born
rule.
Liberty allows many other families besides Eq. (23). If z is replaced everywhere in Eq. (23) by w, where
w could be x or y or any other direction in space, it follows from the spherical symmetry of |ψ0〉 that the
family
ψ0 ⊙ {w+a , w−a } ⊗ {w+b , w−b } ⊙ {w+a , w−a } ⊗ {w+b , w−b }, (26)
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is consistent, yielding the same probabilities in Eq. (24) and marginals in Eq. (25) if w is replaced by z in
these expressions. Perhaps of greater interest is the family
ψ0 ⊙ {z+a , z−a } ⊗ {w+b , w−b } ⊙ {z+a , z−a } ⊗ {w+b , w−b }, (27)
with Sz for particle a, but Sw, with w an arbitrary but specific direction, for particle b. The family is
consistent, but now four histories have nonzero probability:
Pr(z+a1, w
−
b1; z
+
a2, w
−
b2) = Pr(z
−
a1, w
+
b1; z
−
a2, w
+
b2)
= (1/2) cos2(θ/2),
Pr(z+a1, w
+
b1; z
+
a2, w
+
b2) = Pr(z
−
a1, w
−
b1; z
−
a2, w
−
b2)
= (1/2) sin2(θ/2). (28)
Note that whatever value Sbw has at time t1, it has exactly the same value (with probability 1) at time t2,
just as one would have expected for a particle in the absence of any interaction with the rest of the world.
Again the marginals at time t2, Pr(z
+
a2, w
−
b2) and the like, have values given by the Born rule. And note
that the three consistent families in Eqs. (23), (26), and (27) are all mutually incompatible, except for the
special case in which w is equal to z or to −z; there is no meaningful way to combine the corresponding
probabilities.
V C Measurements
Consider a measurement of Sz on particle a. In any fundamental quantum analysis the measuring
apparatus must also be included as part of the total system, and described in fully quantum mechanical
terms. Thus we use a Hilbert space Ha⊗HM ⊗Hb, and assume that for t and t′ in the range of interest the
total unitary time development operator
T (t′, t) = TaM (t
′, t)⊗ Tb(t′, t) (29)
factors into a piece TaM in which particle a interacts with the apparatus, and a piece Tb(t
′, t) = Ib: nothing is
happening to particle b. Further assume that the action of TaM (t
′, t) is given for the range t0 → t1 → t2 → t3
by
|z+a 〉 ⊗ |M0〉 → |z+a 〉 ⊗ |M0〉
→ |z+a 〉 ⊗ |M0〉 → |z¯+a 〉 ⊗ |M+〉,
|z−a 〉 ⊗ |M0〉 → |z−a 〉 ⊗ |M0〉
→ |z−a 〉 ⊗ |M0〉 → |z¯−a 〉 ⊗ |M−〉, (30)
where the arrows indicate how the ket to the left evolves unitarily to the ket on the right during the
corresponding time interval. The final states |z¯+a 〉 and |z¯−a 〉 at t3 are arbitrary and could be omitted from
the discussion (see remarks in Sec. III); the reader who wants to remove the bars is welcome to do so.
Consider the family of histories at times t0 < t1 < t2 < t3
Ψ0 ⊙ {z+a , z−a } ⊗ {z+b , z−b } ⊙ {z+a , z−a } ⊗ {z+b , z−b }
⊙ {M+,M−} ⊗ {z+b , z−b }, (31)
where Ψ0 is the projector on the initial state |Ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉 ⊗ |M0〉 of the system at t0: a singlet spin state
together with an apparatus ready to measure Saz. As in the family in Eq. (24), there are just two histories
with nonzero probabilities:
Pr(z+a1, z
−
b1; z
+
a2, z
−
b2;M
+
3 , z
−
b3) =
Pr(z−a1, z
+
b1; z
−
a2, z
+
b2;M
−
3 , z
+
b3) = 1/2. (32)
From these we can calculate marginal and conditional probabilities using the usual rules of ordinary proba-
bility theory. In particular,
Pr(z+aj |M+3 ) = Pr(z−bk |M+3 ) = 1, (33)
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with j = 1 or 2 and k = 1, 2, or 3. That is, from the measurement outcomeM+ at time t3 one can infer that
particle a at earlier times (but later than t0) had Sz = +1/2, while particle b had Sz = −1/2 at times t1
and t2, and continued to possess this value at time t3. All these results are reasonable in light of the earlier
analysis of Eq. (23) and the probabilities in Eq. (24). Properly designed measurements reveal what is there
to be measured; they do not somehow create reality out of a vacuum.
All these results are inaccessible using the calculational rules of standard textbooks, except for the result
Pr(z−b3 |M+3 ) = 1. One of the standard rules, which students find rather odd and ad hoc, states that if
the outcome of a measurement is, say, M+ at t3, then one should “collapse” (first arrow) and renormalize
(second arrow) the singlet state wave function:
|ψ0〉 → z+a |ψ0〉 = (1/
√
2)|z+a z−b 〉 → |ψ+〉 := |z+a z−b 〉, (34)
and then calculate
Pr(z−b3 |M+3 ) = 〈ψ+|z−b |ψ+〉 = 1. (35)
This is a perfectly good calculational rule, and it can be justified, at least as used in the present context,
on the basis of fundamental quantum principles, though we shall not take the time to do so here. 3 Like
most calculational rules it allows students to obtain the right answer without having to think about what
they are doing, which is in effect calculating a conditional probability. The disadvantage is that they may
mistakenly come to believe that wave function collapse is a physical process rather than a calculational tool.
That there is no nonlocal physical effect associated with it can be seen by noting that the same “collapse”
approach also yields the right answer, Eq. (33) for Sbz at the earlier times t1 and t2 before the measurement
of Saz occurs. And for those interested in relativistic quantum mechanics we remark that at time t1 particle
b can be in the backward light cone of the spacetime region, with t somewhere between t2 and t3, in which
the measuring device interacts with particle a. Backward as well as superluminal causation readily emerges
from quantum theory when calculational methods are confused with physical causes.
Rather than Eq. (31) one can analyze the family
Ψ0 ⊙ {z+a , z−a } ⊗ {w+b , w−b } ⊙
{z+a , z−a } ⊗ {w+b , w−b } ⊙ {M+,M−} ⊗ {w+b , w−b }, (36)
where the focus is now on Sbw in place of Sbz, with w an arbitrary direction in space making an angle θ with
the positive z axis, as in Eq. (27). The resulting conditional probabilities include
Pr(z+aj |M+3 ) = 1, Pr(w+bk |M+3 ) = sin2(θ/2), (37)
Pr(w+bk |w+b1) = Pr(w−bk |w−b1) = 1, (38)
for j = 1, 2 and k = 1, 2, 3. These make perfectly good physical sense. In particular Eq. (38) tells us that
nothing at all is happening to Sbw at any time during the interval between t2 and t3 when particle a is
interacting with the measuring apparatus. Local measurements properly analyzed have no nonlocal effects.
One can also introduce a second measuring apparatus that measures Sbw for particle b, with TbN (t
′, t)
for each time interval in t0 → t1 → t2 → t3 equal to the identity, except t2 → t3 given by [compare Eq. (30)]
|w+b 〉 ⊗ |N0〉 → |w¯+b 〉 ⊗ |N+〉, |w−b 〉 ⊗ |N0〉 → |w¯−b 〉 ⊗ |N−〉. (39)
Readers should have no difficulty checking the consistency and working out the probabilities associated with
the family
Ψ0 ⊙ {z+a , z−a } ⊗ {w+b , w−b } ⊙
{z+a , z−a } ⊗ {w+b , w−b } ⊙ {M+,M−} ⊗ {N+, N−}, (40)
where Ψ0 is now the projector on |Ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉 ⊗ |M0〉 ⊗ |N0〉, and deriving conditional probabilities such as
Pr(z+aj |M+3 ) = Pr(z−aj |M−3 ) = 1, (41)
Pr(w+bj |N+3 ) = Pr(w−bj |N−3 ) = 1, (42)
Pr(N+3 |M+3 ) = Pr(N−3 |M−3 ) = sin2(θ/2), (43)
with j = 1, 2. Textbook rules yield Eq. (43), minus any insights obtained by relating the measurement
outcomes to the particle properties they were designed to measure.
3Strictly speaking, Eq. (34) should be applied only in cases in which the bars are absent in the final a states in the dynamics
in Eq. (30). However, if we are only using the collapsed wave function to calculate properties of particle b this makes no
difference.
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VI Discussion
VI A Locality
What has been shown is that “The Predictions,” as Maudlin2 calls them, of quantum mechanics, in
particular Eq. (43), are produced by a theory in which local measurements have no nonlocal effects: the
measurement of Saz that occurs between t2 and t3 has no effect on Sbw, see Eq. (38). This demonstrates
that there is something amiss with the version of Bell’s argument found in Ref. 2, and because it is compact,
we can hope to locate where the reasoning departs from the consistent principles of quantum mechanics
discussed in Secs. II–IV.
My summary of Maudlin’s argument in Sec. II C of Ref. 2, with the notation changed to make it consistent
with that in Sec. V, is as follows:
M1 Measurements of a given spin component on particles a and b will always yield opposite outcomes: +1/2
for one particle is perfectly correlated with −1/2 for the other.
M2 Assume locality: A measurement carried out on particle a cannot affect the physical state of particle b.
M3 This means that particle b must already have been disposed to yield the opposite result even before
particle a was measured.
M4 Particle b must have been so disposed even when the total quantum mechanical state of the system was
the singlet state |ψ0〉, and at all times since its creation.
M5 Therefore the complete physical description of particle b must determine how it is disposed to yield a
particular outcome for each possible spin measurement, because M1 holds for any spin component.
M6 Hence a local theory must not only be deterministic but also a hidden variable theory (in the sense of
M5).
M7 Any local theory that predicts the EPR correlations must also respect certain constraints on the corre-
lations it predicts (Bell’s inequality).
M8 Quantum mechanics violates these constraints and thus the locality assumption in M2.
Let us compare these assertions with the analysis in Sec. V. Evidently M1 corresponds to the anticorre-
lation expressed in Eq. (25) in terms of the particles themselves, or in Eq. (43) for measurement outcomes,
assuming θ = 0, that is, measurements of the same spin component. Note that although these formulas were
obtained for Saz and Sbz, the results are equally valid if z is replaced, for both particles, with an arbitrary
direction w. 4 As for M2, dynamical locality is ensured by the fact that the time development operator is
a tensor product of the form Ta ⊗ Tb for the particles alone, or TaM ⊗ TbN when measuring apparatuses are
included. Furthermore, direct calculation, see Eq. (38) and the comments following it, shows that the spin
of particle b is unaffected by making a measurement on particle a. And M3, the disposition of the b particle
to yield the opposite result even before the a particle was measured, is evident from the fact that Eqs. (33)
or (37) hold for all applicable values of tj and tk: t1 and t2 before the measurement of particle a and t3 after
the measurement. This disposition resides in the simple fact that the particle actually had at the earlier
time the property which a measurement would later reveal. Thus far everything is fine.
But with M4 we run into difficulties. If by “state of the system” we are to understand |ψ0〉 as the physical
property possessed by the system, then, as noted in Sec. II, there is no meaningful way to ascribe a value
to any component of the spin angular momentum of particle b at this time, because the two projectors do
not commute. Ignoring this is to ignore a crucial difference, one might say the crucial difference, between
the quantum and the classical world: quantum incompatibility. One way out of the difficulty is to consider
|ψ0〉 a pre-probability rather than a property; see the discussion following Eq. (13), and in Ref. 13, Sec. 9.4.
But it is not clear that a reference to |ψ0〉 is really essential for the later stages of Maudlin’s argument, so
perhaps we can replace M4 by a modified form consistent with the framework Eq. (31):
M4′ Particle b was disposed to yield the opposite result of the measurement of particle a at all times
beginning shortly after the interaction of the two particles produced the singlet state.
4Naturally, one has to use a different piece of apparatus to measure different components of the spin angular momentum.
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However, at M5 we arrive at a significant divergence from the principle of Hilbert space quantum mechan-
ics that states that any physical description of a particle at a single time must correspond to some subspace
of its Hilbert space. Neither |ψ0〉 nor any subspace of Hb for particle b can be interpreted as indicating how
particle b is disposed to yield a particular outcome for each possible spin measurement. This is in contrast
to a “classical” spinning object, such as a golf ball, where one can easily imagine a spin state which can be
used to predict, at least with very high precision, the outcome of a measurement of any component of its
spin angular momentum. And there is no obvious way of rewording M5 to evade this difficulty.
What has led to this problem? Let us return to M1 and ask in what sense it holds, as asserted in M5, for
any spin component. Given a particular w, we can choose a consistent family of the form in Eq. (26), add a
measurement apparatus if desired, and come to the conclusion that Saw = −Sbw. It is therefore natural to
assume, and it would be true in a classical world, that Saw = −Sbw is simultaneously true for every w. But
different w lead to different, incompatible frameworks, and therefore this last conclusion violates the single
framework rule of consistent quantum reasoning. Nothing similar ever arises in pre-quantum physics, so it
is easy to make this kind of mistake by employing classical reasoning in a domain where it does not work,
namely, Hilbert-space quantum mechanics.
The foregoing analysis indicates what seems to be the critical misstep in the presentation of Bell’s
argument in Ref. 2: classical reasoning applied to the description of microscopic quantum particles in a
way that violates the principles of Hilbert space quantum mechanics, as expressed by the single framework
rule. As noted in Sec. II, Birkhoff and von Neumann were aware that Hilbert space quantum mechanics is
incompatible with classical modes of reasoning. Ignoring this insight does not make the problem go away,
and numerous quantum paradoxes, along with the claim that the quantum world is pervaded with nonlocal
influences that violate relativity theory, can be seen to have their roots in a failure to deal seriously with
the logical problem posed by a Hilbert space description. But the connection of all this with counterfactual
arguments deserves some additional discussion.
VI B Counterfactuals
Blaylock1 claims that a key component in Bell’s inequality, or at least an argument leading to it, is
counterfactual definiteness: the assumption that a measurement that was not performed had a single definite
result. He concludes that therefore the violation of Bell’s inequality by quantum mechanics does not by itself
imply nonlocality. Does our analysis throw some light on this matter?
It is helpful to explore the issue of counterfactuals in quantum mechanics starting with a simpler example
than the one considered in Sec. V, namely a measurement of a component of spin angular momentum in a
situation in which the apparatus can be adjusted to measure either Sz or Sx. For example, for a particle
traveling along the y axis one could imagine rotating the Stern-Gerlach magnet so that the field gradient
is parallel to z or to x. Naturally, only one component can be measured in a given run; suppose that in
a particular case it was Sz. Then the following counterfactual question seems sensible: What would have
been the result if the apparatus had been set up to measure Sx instead? And we can ask: is the answer
to this question different for the (real) quantum world than it would be for a (hypothetical) classical world?
It is possible to set up a model in which the measurement axis is determined by the outcome of “flipping a
quantum coin,” and address the situation inside the total closed system (coin plus apparatus plus particle
being measured) using the appropriate quantum analysis to calculate the probabilities for a single consistent
family; see Ref. 13, Chap. 19. There is no problem finding a decomposition of the identity which includes the
apparatus pointer positions for both outcomes of the quantum coin flip. But to describe this as an authentic
measurement in which the pointer position is correlated with a state before the measurement we need to
include the corresponding particle property at a time before the measurement took place. In the case of
the Sz measurement the corresponding particle projectors will be z
+ and z−, whereas for the counterfactual
Sx measurements we would like to use x
+ and x−. However, the z projectors do not commute with the x
projectors, so they cannot both be placed in the same consistent family. Note that the issue raised here has
no direct connection with locality; we are considering only a single measurement on a single particle at a
single location.
Valid counterfactual reasoning in the quantum domain ought to follow the same standards as ordinary
reasoning, which is to say it must be restricted to a single consistent family. Thus the incompatibility at the
microscopic level discussed in the previous paragraph can render a quantum counterfactual argument invalid
even if the corresponding classical argument is correct, or at least plausible. There is never a problem if
we limit the discussion to measurement outcomes and exclude all talk, even implicit, of particle properties
preceding the measurement. However, Bell inequality derivations always make some assumption about what
14
goes on in the world prior to the measurements themselves, and Maudlin’s argument for nonlocality is filled
with references to particle properties, so in either case counterfactual parts of the argument, if present, could
well be in conflict with quantum theory. Even in the classical domain, counterfactual arguments can make
an implicit reference to a preceding state of affairs, which may make it difficult to analyze their structure;
see Ref. 13, Sec. 19.3. So is is plausible that something like that will also be present when these arguments
are applied to quantum situations.
In fact it is possible to arrive at Maudlin’s M5, which as we pointed is in conflict with quantum theory
as consistently interpreted using histories, by employing the following counterfactual argument:
We know that if Sz is measured for particle a and the outcome is Saz = +1/2, then Sbz was −1/2 even
before a measurement which confirmed that it had this value. If on the other hand Saw, with w some other
direction in space, had been measured with, say, the outcome +1/2, then by the same line of reasoning Sbw
would have had the value −1/2, which would have been confirmed by a later measurement had it measured
Sbw. So the b particle must have had a definite value of Sbw for every possible w before any measurement
took place, namely, the opposite of the outcome of the Saw measurement which did not but could have taken
place.
This argument is of the counterfactual type because it starts with the assumption that Saz was measured
in the actual world and Saw in the imaginary or counterfactual world. In it one sees a connection with
what Blaylock considers suspicious about derivations of Bell’s inequality: counterfactual definiteness, the
assumption that unperformed measurements have definite outcomes. The historian will point to a failure to
follow the single framework rule as the most likely error on the route from seemingly reasonable assumptions
to a conclusion that is obviously wrong, at least if Hilbert space quantum mechanics is accepted as the
physicist’s fundamental description of the world; see the discussion of M5 in Sec. VI A above. One cannot be
sure that Maudlin was using this kind of argument to arrive at what I have called M5, although the following
quotation from Ref. 2, p. 123, the second sentence of which is to a degree counterfactual (and contains a
whiff of free choice), suggests it may not have been all that far from his thinking:
“The only way to give a local physical account of the EPR correlations is for each of the particles
to be initially disposed to yield a particular outcome for each possible spin measurement. For if
either particle is not so disposed and if we happen to measure the spin in the relevant direction
(as we might), then there could be no guarantee that the outcomes of the two measurements will
be anticorrelated.”
In summary it seems plausible that flawed (from the quantum perspective) counterfactual reasoning
provides at least one possible route for deriving Bell’s inequality, with its conclusions inapplicable to the real
(quantum) world, and in this respect the analysis given in this paper supports Blaylock’s conclusions. For
more on the subject of the correct use of counterfactuals in the quantum domain, see Ref. 13, Chap. 19.
VII Conclusion
What we have shown by means of a counterexample is that quantum violations of Bell’s inequality are
perfectly consistent with quantum mechanics being a local theory, in the sense that measurements near one
point in space do not immediately affect what goes on elsewhere. So the claim by Maudlin2 that no local
theory can reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics is incorrect, at least for the situation under
discussion: two spin-half particles initially in a singlet state. Much more can be said about quantum locality,
and Ref. 5 gives a more extensive treatment of the topic using the histories formulation in a consistent
manner to sort out the issues. There the suggestion is made that Bell’s inequality is best thought of as being
appropriate to the domain of classical physics but not quantum physics: it has a perfectly good derivation, at
least for all practical purposes, in the case of golf balls, and one can see explicitly how this derivation breaks
down as the total angular momentum quantum number decreases from around 1030 to 1/2. Thus there is
nothing wrong with Maudlin’s reasoning, except that it is does not apply to the quantum world. Here new
rules of reasoning are needed, as Birkhoff and von Neumann20 realized, even though their particular proposal
has not turned out to be a fruitful approach for understanding quantum mechanics.
The extent to which counterfactual reasoning of a sort inconsistent with quantum principles is a necessary
part of derivations of Bell’s inequality is less clear, though this is certainly one route for getting there, as
Blaylock1 pointed out. In particular, it is plausible that Maudlin’s version of the Bell argument makes use
of some form of counterfactual reasoning, and in this sense the present article supports the conclusion of
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Blaylock that counterfactual reasoning, rather than an assumption of locality, is why derivations of Bell’s
inequality lead to conclusions inconsistent with quantum theory and experiment.
An important lesson to be drawn from all of this is the need for a clear presentation of consistent
principles of quantum reasoning in textbooks and courses. When teaching courses on quantum information
I always stress the fact that there are no nonlocal influences in quantum theory, and point out that this
principle is useful to keep in mind when analyzing quantum circuits. Unfortunately, physics students trained
in traditional quantum courses have difficulty replacing, or at least augmenting, the calculational rules
they learned by rote with a consistent probabilistic analysis of what is going on. They may already have
learned that the superluminal influences reflected in violations of Bell’s inequality cannot be used to transmit
information. But they also need to hear a simple explanation for why this is so: such influences do not exist.
They are nothing but fudge factors needed to correct a mistaken use of classical reasoning in the quantum
domain.
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